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EQUAL MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
UNDER SENATE BILL 569: "TO HAVE
AND TO HOLD" TAKES ON NEW
MEANING IN CALIFORNIA
The respective interests of the husband and wife in community
property during continuance of the marriage relation are present,
existing and equal interests.'
[E]ither spouse has the management and control of the commun-
ity personal property, with absolute power of disposition,... 2
I. INTRoDUCTION
The 1973 California legislature took a progressive step m the
spirit of the pending Equal Rights Amendment by amending the
California community property laws3 to give equal management
and control over the marital community property4 to both spouses.
Numerous changes were made in the present law which will alter
the legal relationship between spouses concerning the community
and separate property interests of each spouse; between spouses
and their creditors in credit transactions; 5 and between spouses
and third party claimants in certain tort actions.6 Most of these
changes will take effect January 1, 1975, but some changes will
become operative during the period between January 1, 1974 and
January 1, 1975.7
1. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5105 (West Supp. 1974). [hereinafter all references
cited to the West Supplement 1974 will become effective January 1, 1975,
unless otherwise noted. Additionally, all references made to a section
number will be to the California Civil Code unless otherwise noted]. For
parallel citations of the sections cited from the West Supplement 1974,
see West's Legislative Service, Statute and Code Amendments, 1973-1974
Regular Session, ch. 987, at 2238-42.
2. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 5125 (West Supp. 1974).
3. CAL. Civ. CoDE §§ 5100-38 (West 1970). [hereinafter referred to as
the "old law" where unchanged by the 1973 legislation, whereas changed
sections effective January 1, 1975, will be referred to as the "new law"].
4. "Marital community property" for the purposes of this Comment in-
cludes all the community property exclusive of the community property
that was under the management and control of the wife under the old
law, which included her earnings and damages received in satisfaction of
a judgment for personal injury. See CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 5124-27 (West 1970).
5. See text accompanying footnotes 36-60, infra.
6. See text accompanying footnotes 84-109, infra.
7. See CAL. Civ. CoDE § 5116 (West Supp. 1974). Section 5116 is the
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On its face, it would appear simple to give both spouses equal
management and control of the community property without un-
due complications. The problem arises in the fact that present
community property laws date back to the annexation of California
as a State. Spanish-Mexican civil law controlled the relationship
between husbands and wives at that time and vestiges of that law
are still present in the Civil Code and decisional law of California.
A dominant feature of prior and existing law is the principal
Tole played by the husband as head of the family and manager
of the community property.8 His role will be altered significantly
as a result of granting to the wife an equal voice in the mangement
and control of the community property.9 As a general proposition,
the right to manage and control the community property gave rise
to many incidental legal consequences and the single element of
control had direct legal consequences on almost the entire commu-
nity property law system. It is therefore the purpose of this com-
ment to isolate and analyze the direct and indirect ramifications
of some of the changes made to the Civil Code10 and to forecast
the potential problem areas these changes may create. In fur-
therance of this objective, the discussion emphasizes the new law's
effect on post-marital obligations, separate property liability and
tort liability emanating from California's "Permissive Use" stat-
ute.11
II. EQUAL MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF THE COM1MUNITY
PROPERTY By BOTH SPOUSES
It can be assumed from the changes in the present law that the
primary intention of the legislature in enacting Senate Bill No.
56912 was to put the wife on equal terms with her husband under
only amended section which provides for changes operative between Jan-
uary 1, 1974 and January 1, 1975. See text accompanying footnotes 44-46,
infra.
8. See generally, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5105, 5125 and 5127 (West 1970).
9. See notes 14, 16-18 infra.
10. California Senate Bill No. 569 (West Cal. Stats. 1973, ch. 987) made
extensive changes to the California Civil Code sections pertaining to the
community property law. This Comment makes no pretense of thoroughly
analyzing all of these changes, although most of them are mentioned
within the text.
11. See Anonymous, Review of Selected 1973 California Legislation, 5
PAc. L. Rav. 352 (1974), for a section-by-section analysis of the changed
sections. (note that there have been subsequent amendments to Senate Bill
569 since this article went to print which materially affect some portions
of the article not herein cited).
12. West Cal. Stats. 1973, ch. 987, §§ 1-17, at 2238-42. [hereinafter re-
ferred to as Senate Bill 569]. There will be a cleanup bill for S.B. 569
(S.B. 1601-1974) which will include a section clarifying the Legislature's
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the community property laws. 13 To this end Section 510514 was
partially deleted, Sections 5110,1' 512516 and 512 7 1T were amended
and Section 512418 was repealed. These changes have successfully
achieved consistency in the statutory language relevant to man-
agement and control of the community property in the various sec-
tions; however, throughout this comment emphasis will be placed
on the projected impact of the changes themselves rather than a
survey of their physical changes. 19
The repeal of Section 5124 and the deletions to Section 5105,
taken together with the amendments to Sections 5125 and 5127,
constitute the key changes which grant equal management and
control of the community property to both spouses. All incidents
of management and control that previously accrued to the husband
or wife under these sections will now flow equally to each spouse,
including the obligations and liabilities as well as the beneficial
aspects that accompanied the right to manage and control the com-
munity property under the old law.
In this regard, a married woman will realize new freedom to
alienate the marital community property incident to her equal
right to manage and control such property. This freedom will ex-
intent as to the prospective or retroactive application of S.B. 569. However,
it was clear from the discussions during the Senate hearings that the intent
of the Legislature was for S.B. 569 to apply to all property, whenever ac-
quired. See Letter from Mari Goldman, Chief Consultant, Joint Committee
on Legal Equality, California Legislature, to John A. Adamske, February
19, 1974, on file in the University of San Diego Law Library.
The constitutionality of retroactive application of S.B. 569 is beyond the
scope of this Comment, but there appears to be no impairment of vested
property rights by the granting of equal management and control to both
spouses that cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. See Addison v. Ad-
dison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965); Knutson, Cali-
fornia Community Property Laws: A Plea for Legislative Study and Re-
form, 39 So. CAL. L. REv. 240, 266-73 (1966). [hereinafter cited as Knutson].
But see Spreckles v. Spreckles, 116 Cal. 339, 48 P. 228 (1897).
13. See note 11 supra, at 352-53.
14. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5105 (West Supp. 1974).
15. Id. § 5110.
16. Id. § 5125.
17. Id. § 5127.
18. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5124 (West 1970, repealed by (West Supp. 1974).
19. For a section-by-section breakdown of the additions and deletions
occasioned by the amendments to the various sections referenced, see CAL.
Civ. CODE §§ 5100-38 (West Supp. 1974), or West's Legislative Service, Stat-
ute and Code Amendments, 1973-1974 Regular Session, ch. 987, at 2238-42.
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tend to both community personal property20 and to community real
property,21 subject to a few specified exceptions equally applicable
to the husband.22 In effect, the wife will be able to act upon the
community property previously under the management and con-
trol of the husband; in like manner, the husband will be able to
act upon the community property previously under the sole control
of the wife.
So long as either spouse does not make a gift of community per-
sonal property or dispose of the same without a valuable consider-
ation, each will be able to alienate the community personal prop-
erty without the consent of the other spouse. Ostensibly this
merely allows the wife to do what the husband was able to do
under the old law. In this regard, however, the fact that under
the new law there will be a "pooling" of all the community prop-
erty into a single entity, affords each spouse increased access to
community property previously beyond his or her control. 23
In the case of a harmonious marital relationship this newly cre-
ated ability of either spouse to secretly encumber the community
property may be of little significance. On the other hand, if the
marriage relationship is unstable because one of the spouses is se-
cretly contemplating separation or dissolution, or if one of the
spouses has spendthrift tendencies, disastrous results might befall
the community with little, if any, recourse available to the unsus-
pecting spouse. One might question whether such broad power
to alienate the community property is wise under many circum-
stances, especially if one spouse contributes a disproportionate
share of the "income"2 4 to the community.
It was just such a fear that led some commentators 25 and the
earlier draft of Senate Bill No. 56926 to propose a modified joint
20. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1974).
21. Id. § 5127.
22. Id. §§ 5125, 5127.
23. The wife's increase will come from the marital community property
previously under the management and control of the husband. See CAL.
Civ. CODE §§ 5125, 5127 (West 1970). The husband in turn will now have
control of the community property previously under the wife's manage-
ment and control. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 5124 (West 1970).
24. "Income" as used in the text is interpreted broadly to include serv-
ices performed in the home by the non-working spouse. See Note, Man-
agement and Control of Community Property: Sex Discrimination in Cali-fornia Law, 6 U.C.D. L. REV. 383, 398 n.31 (1973).
25. Note, Equal Rights and Equal Protection: Who Has Management
and Control?, 46 So. CAL. L. REv. 892, 909-21 (1973); Note, The Equal
Rights Amendment and Inequality Between Spouses Under the California
Community Property System, 6 LOYOLA OF Los ANGELES L. REv. 66, 91-
92 (1973).
26. Senate Bill No. 569, April 2, 1973.
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control approach with a dollar amount limitation on each spouse's
ability to alienate the community property without the joinder or
written consent of the other spouse. Instead of adopting this limi-
tation, the California legislature elected to place few restraints on
the equal management and control by both spouses. The prudence
of this decision is yet to be tested; however, there is little doubt
that this may place increased tension on the relationship between
spouses given the prominence that financial affairs play in foster-
ing marital discord.
There will be a certain amount of restraint imposed upon im-
provident alienation of the community property due to the fidu-
ciary duty between spouses. Under the old law a fiduciary duty
attached incident to the power to manage and control the commu-
nity property which required the managing spouse to act in good
faith when dealing with the community property under his con-
trol.2 7 To the extent a fiduciary duty is imposed upon both
spouses under the new law (as logically it should be, given their
equal power to secretly alienate the community property)2 8 some
degree of protection will be afforded to the community assets.
In one area the new law specifically precludes interference by
one spouse in the other's power to manage and control a portion
of the community property. There will be a significant new ex-
ception to equal management and control when one of the spouses
is operating or managing a business, or an interest in a business,
which is community personal property. A provision in new Sec-
tion 5125(b) 29 assures that a spouse who is operating and man-
aging a business, or an interest therein, which is community per-
sonal property, will have sole management and control over the
business or interest.
As a consequence, the non-managing spouse will be foreclosed
from asserting management and control over the business when
that spouse has little or no expertise in managing the business.
27. See Baker v. Baker, 260 Cal. App. 2d 583, 586, 67 Cal. Rptr. 523,
524 (1968).
28. See text accompanying footnotes 36-6Q, infra.
29. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5125(b) (West Supp. 1974), amending CAL. CIV.
CoDE § 5125 (West 1970), which states:
(b) A spouse who is operating or managing a business or an m-
terest in a business which is community personal property has the
sole management and control of the business or interest.
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What exactly will constitute a "business" under this provision is
open to speculation, but controversy on this issue could arise when
one of the spouses chooses to characterize a borderline activity,
such as stock market transaction, as an independent business for
the purpose of excluding the other spouse.
The consequences of one spouse asserting sole control over a
community personal property business may not be as drastic as
it might seem; that is, the sole control will be limited to managing
the business or interest therein and not to control over the profits
or earnings therefrom. Since such profits or earnings are derived
from a community property source they will be presumed to be
community property under the equal management and control of
both spouses, a result which logically follows when Section 5125(b)
is given a statutory construction consistent with the general pre-
sumption favoring community property in Section 5110. Further-
more, in this area a distinction must be made between the "Sole
Trader" provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 30 which allow a
wife to go into business for herself with the earnings therefrom
becoming her separate property and Section 5125(b) which per-
tains to either spouse, with the profits or earnings becoming com-
munity personal property under the management and control of
both spouses.
Consistent with the foregoing grant of equal treatment of the
spouses, a longstanding presumption under Section 5110 has suc-
cumbed by placing the spouses on equal terms in regard to taking
property by an instrument in writing. Prior to the new changes,
if a wife held real or personal property, acquired during the mar-
riage by an instrument in writing and placed in her name alone,
she held it presumptively as her separate property.31 Section 5110
as amended will limit this presumption to property acquired before
January 1, 197532 and thereafter the section is silent as to the sig-
nificance of either spouse taking property by an instrument in
writing.
It is suggested that the legislature's silence on this issue should
be given its normal construction; that is, the general presumption
favoring community property under section 5110 should apply.33 It
would follow that real or personal property taken by an instru-
ment in writing after January 1, 1975, by either spouse, will be
30. See generally, CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. §§ 1811-21 (West 1972).
31. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1970).
32. Id. § 5110 (West Supp. 1974).
33. CAL. Gov. CODE § 9605 (West Supp. 1974); cf. Alford v. Pierno, 27
Cal. App. 3d 682, 688, 104 Cal. Rptr. 110, 114 (1972).
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presumed to be community property. As a consequence of this
change, the exclusive presumption clause of Section 5110 will ap-
ply in favor of bona fide purchasers of property from either spouse,
but with the important proviso that the presumption is changed
in favor of community property rather than separate property.
After January 1, 1975, a bona fide purchaser will no longer be
able to rely on the presumed separate property character of prop-
erty acquired from a married woman just because the property
appears solely in her own name in the instrument of title. If the
property held solely in the wife's name is personal property, she
will be able to alienate such property to the same extent a hus-
band was able to under the old law. In contrast, if the property
involved is community real property within the provisions of Sec-
tion 5127, then the presumptions under that Section will be ex-
tended to apply equally to the wife after January 1, 1975. Hence-
forth the sole execution by the wife of a lease, contract, mortgage
or deed relating to community real property shall be presumed
to be valid.34 Heretofore this presumption, along with the provi-
sions to avoid such transactions, applied only to the husband.
As a practical matter, the wife will be able to deal with the
community personal and real property on the same terms as her
husband under the new law. In this regard, if the wife seeks to
perfect a separate property acquisition or conveyance of either per-
sonal or real property she will have to do so in the same manner
as her husband. In many situations a wife will have to produce
adequate evidence of the separate property character of the con-
sideration or property exchanged if she wants to perfect or retain
that characterization of the property.
The foregoing discussion of the amended equal management and
control sections merely scratches the surface in regard to the full
impact that the redistribution of control will have to certain as-
pects of California's community property laws. For this reason
a closer look at some specific collateral effects of the new changes
must be undertaken to more accurately depict the magnitude of,
and offer some helpful insight into, the full ramifications of these
changes.
34. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1974).
35. Id. § 4 (West 1954).
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II. Coi mwunr LiAnm=Br FOR EITnm SPOUSE'S
POST-MARITAL OBLIGATIONS
A husband in California has long enjoyed a superior position in
the community affairs regarding his ability to encumber and bor-
row against the community assets; hereafter, if the new statutory
language can be taken at face value, a married woman will share
equally in both these respects. The husband's advantageous posi-
tion under the old law was a natural incident of his dominant role
as manager of the marital community assets and consequently the
community was not liable for the post-marital obligations of the
wife3 c because she did not share the management and control re-
sponsibilities. To the extent that the general proposition under
the old law-the ability to bind the community property flows di-
rectly from the right to manage and control such property-is
carried over to the new law, it follows that both spouses will have
an equal capacity to bind the community property by their post-
marital obligations.
To lend statutory support to married women's newfound ability
to bind the community in credit transactions, several changes in
the law were designed to specifically ensure that wives would be
treated on equal terms with their husbands in this respect. Chap-
ter 999 of the 1973 California Statutes37 created new Civil Code
Sections 1812.3038 and 1812.3139 which, respectively, provide for
equal treatment of women in credit transactions and create a civil
remedy for a denial of credit under designated conditions.40 Com-
panion changes were made to Section 511641 to lend consistency
and compatability to these interrelated sections of the Civil Code.
A transition period of one year's duration was needed in this
area because commencing January 1, 1974, the community will be
liable for the wife's contracts to the extent that her earnings or
separate property have been commingled with the community
property; however, the wife will not receive her right to equal
management and control of the community property until January
36. Id. § 5116 (West 1970), as amended, CAL. Civ. CODE § 5116 (West
Supp. 1974).
37. See West Cal. Stats. 1973, ch. 999, §§ 1-4, at 2318-19.
38. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1812.30 (West Supp. 1974), which in pertinent part
provides in subsection (a) that:
No married woman shall be denied credit in her own name if her
uncomminegled earnings or separate property are such that a man
possessing the same amount of property or earnings would receive
credit. [Emphasis added].
39. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1812.31 (West Supp. 1974).
40. Id. § 1812.31(a), (b).
41. Id. § 5116.
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1, 1975. Consequently, during the one year period creditors needed
assurance that they could reach the community assets to secure
credit extended to the wife. Under the old law a creditor was
unable to reach the wife's earnings or separate property which had
been commingled with the marital community property because
once such property was commingled it was beyond the control of
the wife42 and hence, was beyond the reach of her creditors.43 To
foreclose the possibility of creditors using this fact as an argument
to frustrate the purpose of new Section 1812.30, Section 5116 was
amended so that part of that section became effective on January
1, 1974,44 with additional changes to take effect on January 1,
1975.45
The thrust of the change to Section 5116 that became effective
January 1, 1974, is to create an exception, to last for one year,
to the previous rule that the husband gained control over the wife's
earnings and separate property if commingled with the marital
community property. During the period between January 1, 1974
and January 1, 1975, the earnings and separate property of the
wife which become commingled with the marital community prop-
erty will be available to satisfy creditors' claims arising from the
wife's contracts. It is felt that this will help ease the reluctance
of creditors to extend credit to married women, thus alleviating
one of the obstacles which prevented married women from attain-
ing equal status with their husbands under the old law.46
The transition period between January 1, 1974 and January 1,
1975, may still present some formidable problems for both creditors
and married women. Creditors may have to bear the burden of
42. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5124 (West 1970) [repeated effective January 1,
1975, by West Cal. Stats. 1973, ch. 987, § 13, at 2241].
43. Id. This, in effect, brought such property under the management
and control of the husband. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 5110 (West 1970).
44. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5116 (West Supp. 1974).
45. Id.
46. It was the author's experience after talking to knowledgable indi-
viduals in major banking institutions in Southern California that: (1)
Credit requirements have been relaxed on married women seeking per-
sonal loans as a direct result to the enactment of Section 1812.30(a); (2)
Creditors intend to rely on the provisions of Section 1812.30(a) to reach
commingled earnings of the wife when necessary; but (3) Whenever possi-
ble attempts are made to join the husband in the transaction when credit
is extended to married women. For obvious reasons the source of this
information requested to remain anonymous.
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tracing marital community property to a separate property source
of the wife, or to community property which was previously under
her management and control, to overcome the well-established rule
that the husband had sole control over the marital community
property regardless of its original source. If this contention is cor-
rect, creditors will be subjected to an additional burden when
credit is extended to married women which does not arise when
credit is extended to married men; hence, creditors might justifi-
ably differentiate between married men and women without violat-
ing the provisions of Section 1812.30 (a) during 1974.
In like manner, married women may find that the general pre-
sumption favoring the community property characterization of
property acquired during the marriage is a hindrance to obtaining
credit during 1974. Taking the proviso in Section 1812.30 (a) that
"if her [married woman's] uncommingled earnings or separate
property are such that a man possessing the same amount of prop-
erty would receive credit,"47 it is arguable that a married woman
will carry the burden of demonstrating that there are in fact such
funds commingled, and remaining, within the marital community
property under the husband's control. Absent such a showing (to
the satisfaction of the creditor) credit could be denied without ex-
posing the creditor to civil liability under Section 1812.31.48
Consistent with the foregoing analysis it is suggested that before
a married woman can benefit from Sections 1812.30 (a) and 1812.31,
she will have to demonstrate independent financial resources which
would have enabled her to obtain credit under the prior law. As
a practical matter, and in the majority of cases, such a burden
on the wife would effectively foreclose any hope for an improved
credit standing during the transition period of 1974.
After January 1, 1975, married women will truly acquire new
freedom to bind the community by their contracts entered into
during the continuance of the marriage. The transition Section
511640 will be superseded by a new Section 511650 which does not
contain the restrictive language of the superseded sections. New
Section 5116 clearly states that the property of the community is
liable for the contracts of either spouse made after marriage and
47. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.30 (a) (West Supp. 1974).
48. Id. § 1812.31. - Subsection (a) of this section provides in cases of
wilful violations of Section 1812.30 for a woman to "Bring an action to
recover actual damages and five hundred dollars ($500) in addition
thereto, for each and every wilful violation."
49. West Cal. Stats, 1973, ch. 999, § 2, at 2319.
50. Id. § 3. See also discussion accompanying note 7, supra.
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subsequent to January 1, 1975.51 Taken together with the other
new sections giving both spouses equal management and control
of the community property5 2 the wife will be ostensibly equal with
her husband in her ability to manage, control and obtain credit
secured by the community property.
In addition to the equal treatment of both spouses in regard to
the ability to bind the community assets, each spouse, and es-
pecially the wife, will have access to funds heretofor beyond
either's control. Since the wages or earnings of both spouses will
become community property, either spouse will be able to expose
the entire community to liability to the full extent of the com-
bined wages of both spouses. In contrast, under the old law each
spouse had control over his or her own wages and thus such wages
were exempt from liability for debts incurred by the other spouse,
except in limited situations.53
Similar exemptions for each spouse's wages were contained in
the original enactment of new Section 5116,54 but this proviso was
deleted in the final enactment of Section 5116(c). 55 If this restric-
tion had not been removed it would have been devastating to a
non-working spouse's ability to obtain credit, for in the majority
of cases the bulk of the community assets are derived in substan-
tial part from spousal wages. Under Section 5116 as finally
adopted, the fact that there is only one wage-earner in the com-
munity will not work a detriment to the nonworking spouse; that
is to say, indebtedness incurred by either spouse can be satisfied
in turn from the wages of the other because there is no limitation
51. CAL. Cry. CODE § 5116(c) (West Supp. 1974), which states:
(c) The property of the community is liable for the contracts of
either spouse which are made after marriage and on or after Jan-
uary 1, 1975.
52. See text accompanying footnotes 12-34, infra.
53. The wife's earnings were liable for debts incurred by the husband
"for the necessities of life furnished ... while they are living together."
CAL. CIv. CODE § 5117 (West 1970). Community property under the man-
agement and control of the husband (including his earnings), was avail-
able to the wife to the extent necessary to fulfill her duty to support her
children. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5127.5 (West Supp. 1974). (It should be noted
that the provisions of Section 5127.5 will be rendered superfluous after the
new law takes effect January 1, 1975, yet the section was left unamended
by the new changes).
54. West Cal. Stats. 1973, ch. 987, § 7, at 2240.
55. West Cal. Stats. 1973, ch. 999, § 3, at 2319.
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on the source of community property subject to such liability. As
a general proposition this new change will be more beneficial to
married women than to their husbands since fewer wives are the
sole wage earner in the community; furthermore, if and when they
do work, wives ordinarily earn less on the average than their hus-
bands.56
A logical consequence of the new provisions of Section 5116
would be the creation of a new presumption that general credit
extended to a married woman is intended to be granted on the
credit of the community. In contrast, the general rule in Califor-
nia is well established that the status of the credit extended
(whether a creditor is relying on the borrower's separate or com-
munity assets as security) is determined by the subjective intent
of the creditor.57 Consequently under the old law when credit was
extended to a husband the creditor could rely on either the sep-
arate property of the husband or the community property under
the husband's control, depending on the creditor's intent.
Needless to say, a creditor seldom intended to extend credit to
a married woman in reliance on the community property because
of the aforementioned rule. Rather, the creditor was quick to re-
quire joinder of the husband in the transaction or obtain assur-
ances that the wife possessed sufficient separate property. It is
suggested that the new equal treatment of the wife will encom-
pass the rationale of the longstanding rule that applied to the hus-
band under the old law and will be extended to apply to the wife
as well under the new law. After January 1, 1975, absent an ex-
press provision to the contrary, a creditor should be able to rely
on the credit of the community for contracts when extending credit
solely to the wife.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, then new Civil Code Section
1812.30 (a) must be intended to operate only during the transition
period between January 1, 1974 and January 1, 1975. Otherwise,
after the wife is given equal management and control of the com-
nity property under the new law an important incident thereof
(that is, an ability to obtain general credit secured by the com-
munity property) will be negated by the provisions of Section
1812.30 (a)." In fact, the requirement that a wife must show that
the community property partially consists of her commingled
56. Note, supra note 24, at 385 nn. 10 & 11.
57. Estate of Ellis, 203 Cal. 414, 416-17, 264 P. 743, 744 (1928). See also
Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal. 2d 202, 210, 259 P.2d 656, 661 (1953); Kenney
v. Kenney, 128 Cal. App. 2d 128, 142, 274 P.2d 951, 960 (1954).
58. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1812.30 (a) (West Supp. 1974),
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wages or separate property is contrary to the spirit and purpose
of the new changes. Once the new provisions take effect the com-
mingling of earnings by either spouse will have no legal conse-
quence because both spouses will have equal access to the entire
community property. For these reasons it should follow that Sec-
tion 1812.30(a) will be either amended or repealed prior to Jan-
uary 1, 1975, to maintain consistency with the intention of Senate
Bill No. 569 to liberalize a married woman's ability to obtain credit
as a natural incident of her new equal control over the commu-
nity property.
There is another change concerning the post-marital liability of
the community that is worth mentioning. With the repeal of old
Section 5124 the wife has lost her exclusive right to manage and
control her earnings and community property personal injury dam-
ages received by her during the marriage. 59 After January 1, 1975,
debts incurred by the husband can be satisfied from these sources
because such funds will become part of the community property
accessible to both spouses. For most wives this should entail a
small loss compared to the new access they will have to the ma-
jority of the community property previously under the husband's
sole control.
An overall view of the preceding analysis leads one to conclude
that the law has taken a step in the right direction, but the impact
of the changes will depend in large part upon a workable relation-
ship within the family itself. Some of the anachronistic views sur-
rounding a wife's ability to manage the community financial af-
fairs have been dealt a lethal blow and the wife will now have
her chance to bury them for good. In the process, creditors will
enjoy easier access to the community assets due to the power of
either spouse to subject the entire community property to liability.
The fact that each spouse has this unrestrained power over the
entire community property may be a necessary evil worthy of tol-
eration, especially when balanced against alleviating the dissimi-
lar treatment of women (based upon the over-inclusive classifica-
tion by their sex), which arguably was destined to succumb to
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause or the Equal Rights
59. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5124 (West 1970) [repeated effective January 1,
1975, by West Cal. Stats. 1973, ch. 987, § 13, at 2241].
Amendment if ratified.60 From the husband's standpoint, the
worst that can be said for the changes in this area is that some
husbands will now have to live with the risk of improvident ex-
penditures of the community assets by the wife-a risk the wife
has long endured.
IV. SEPARATE PROPERTY RAMIFICATIONS oF THE NEW EQuAL
MANAGEMENT AM CONTROL PROVISIONS
The separate property holdings of both the husband61 and the
wife6 2 will be affected in several important respects by the new
changes. As with most of the changes under the new law, the
impact of the changes in this area will depend to a great extent
on the financial make-up of the particular marital unit. To gen-
eralize at the outset, it can be said that the wife's separate property
will be exposed to increased liability by putting her on equal terms
with her husband, but both spouses will enjoy an increased poten-
tial for acquisitions of separte property vis-a-vis interspousal gifts
in various forms. These developments are occasioned by changes
to Sections 5120, 63 5121,64 512265 and 5132,66 all effective January
1, 1975.
New Liability for the Wife's Separate Property
Section 5120 addresses itself to separate property liability for the
antenuptial debts of the spouses. Under the old unamended pro-
visions of this section the husband's separate property and earnings
after marriage were not liable for the debts of the wife contracted
before the marriage. As amended the section clearly states that,
"Neither the separate property of a spouse nor the earnings of the
spouse is liable for the debts of the other spouse contracted before
the marriage."67  This change is consistent with the new equal
treatment of the spouses and should have little effect on the wife's
separate property liability; however, in contrast, while the amend-
ments to Section 5121 concerning post-nuptial liability of the
spouses appears equally as innocent on its face, these changes will
be of greater significance.
Separate property liability of the wife for post-marital debts in-
60. Note, supra note 24, at 390-400.
61. CAL. CXV. CODE § 5108 (West 1970).
62. Id. § 5107.
63. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5120 (West Supp. 1974).
64. Id. § 5121.
65. Id. § 5122.
66. Id. § 5132.
67. Id. § 5120.
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curred by her husband was very limited under the old law and
attached only to debts contracted for the necessities of life fur-
nished while the spouses were living together.," Furthermore, the
extent of the wife's separate property liability was restricted to
rents and profits from the separate property held by her at the
time of the marriage.6 9 New Section 5121, which applies to the
separate property of both spouses removes the limitation on the
source of the separate property subject to liability and qualifies
"necessities of life" by incorporating the provisions of Section
5132,70 which was also amended by the new changes.
The first significant consequence of the amendment to Section
5121 is that all the wife's separate property, regardless of its source
or time of acquisition, will be liable for the satisfaction of debts
incurred by her husband during the marriage, if the debts are in-
curred pursuant to Section 5132. Before making projections as to
the scope of liability contemplated by amended Section 5132, fur-
ther analysis of the changes made to Section 5121 is necessary to
fully understand the crossover implications between these sections.
While old Section 5121 subjected the wife's separate property to
liability for debts contracted by the husband for the necessities
of life, there were significant limitations on the source of separate
property available for such liability; that is, separate property
held by the wife at the time of her marriage or acquired by her
by devise, succession, or gift after the marriage (other than by
gift or agreement from the husband) was exempt from liability.71
In contrast, under the new law afl of the wife's separate property
will be subjected to liability under new Section 5121.72 The key
issue to be resolved before the full extent of this liability can be
ascertained is to determine how amended Section 5132 will be con-
strued by the courts.
68. Id. § 5121.
69. Id., quoting the pertinent part of the section which states:
[P]rovided, that the provisions of the foregoing proviso [wife's
separate property liability for the husband's debts] shall not apply
to the separate property of the wife held by her at the time of
her marriage or acquired by her by devise, succession, or gift,
other than by gift from the husband, after marriage.
70. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5132 (West Supp. 1974), in relevant part provides:
A spouse must support the other spouse while they are living to-
gether out of separate property of the spouse when there is no
community property or quasi-community property.
71. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5121 (West 1970).
72. Id. § 5121 (West Supp. 1974).
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Whatever the extent of liability under Section 5132, it is clear
that such liability can be satisfied from the separate property of
either spouse pursuant to Section 5121. To complicate matters,
Section 5132 itself was amended in several material respects. On
its face the section appears to impose a mutual duty of support
on both spouses by stating, "A spouse must support the other
spouse while they are living together out of the separate property
of the spouse when there is no community property or quasi-com-
munity property. '7 3 Noticeably missing from the amended version
of this section are some of the conditions precedent which gave
rise to liability under the old law.
Specifically, the former conditions required that the husband
show: first, that he had no separate property of his own; and sec-
ondly, that he was suffering from an infirmity which rendered him
unable to support himself. Both of these requirements have been
deleted by the amendments to Section 5132. The significance of
these changes might be aptly termed "the emancipation of mal-
ingering husbands," for surely the thrust of the section is a drastic
departure from the traditional concept of the husband as the pri-
mary provider in the American family. A feasible construction
of new Section 5132 is that it gives rise to an affirmative duty
on the part of both spouses to support each other.
Superficially, Section 5132 presents a dilemma when both spouses
have separate property but neither is willing to support the other
from that property. Theoretically either spouse will be able to
rely on the separate property of the other for support, even when
the spouse needing support from the other has separate property
of his or her own. To the extent that the old law is carried over
in this area there should be little controversy because up to now
the law has clearly held that the husband had the primary respon-
sibility to support the community. 74
If the courts construe new Section 5132 as imposing a mutual
duty upon both spouses to support each other the issue of how
this duty would be apportioned between the spouses will be ripe
for clarification. When both spouses have separate property but
there is insufficient community property to support them, a possi-
ble alternative would be for each spouse to provide for his or her
own needs. The problem with such a "volunteer approach" is the
possible detrimental effect it might have on the family unit itself.
73. Id. § 5132 [emphasis added].
74. See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 778, 784, 415 P.2d 776, 780, 51 CaL Rptr. 888,
892 (1966); see also 1 California Family Lawyer §§ 5.12 and 5.14 (1961).
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In the past the law has judiciously protected the family unit and
a new challenge will confront the courts in this regard.
It is suggested here that the law should, and will, find a pri-
mary duty to support the community (rather than leaving the is-
sue unsettled for resolution by the spouses themselves) by one or
the other of the spouses dependent on the relevant considerations
involved. Perhaps the primary duty to support the community
should fall on the working spouse, but this may be unjust when
the non-working spouse has extensive separate property holdings
which could ease the burden on the working spouse. Another com-
plication would arise under this approach if both spouses worked,
but earned different amounts. In such a case would the duty to
support be imposed in proportion to the contribution of each?
Perhaps the time has come to implement a "deeper pocket" ap-
proach to interspousal support obligations. The law could impose
the primary duty to support the family upon the spouse in the
better financial position at any given period during the marriage.
Some readjustment in this area should be forthcoming, but it is
suggested here that the alternative approaches just mentioned
would impose administrative difficulties for our present court sys-
tem. Additionally, the lack of a judicially recognized primary duty
of support upon one of the spouses would complicate, and possibly
encourage, litigation of this issue. This does not discount the fact
that one or several of these alternatives might not be the "best"
solution in a particular family situation.
There is some support for the contention that the courts may
be forced to implement an approach to this problem which will
treat the spouses equally regardless of the burden it might impose
on the courts. In this regard, a husband has lost his statutory
status as head of the family by repeal of Section 5101, Tr effective
January 1, 1975, which supports the view that judicial recognition
of a relaxed position on the husband's obligations towards his fam-
ily may be imperative.
75. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5101 (West 1970) [repealed effective January 1,
1975, by West Cal. Stats. 1973, ch. 987, § 2, at 2238]. Under the old law
the husband could choose any reasonable place or mode of living and the
wife was required, under the law, to conform to his wishes. See Waldeck
v. Hedden, 89 Cal. App. 485, 491, 265 P.2d 340, 343 (1928).
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New Potential For Separate Property Accumulations by
Both Spouses.
In addition to the possibility of increased separate property li-
ability discussed in the preceding text, there will be some compen-
sating changes which will enable either spouse to actually increase
his or her separate property under the new changes. This develop-
ment is primarily due to the enhanced ability of either spouse to
make interspousal gifts as a natural incident of the equal control
each will have under the new law.
It was well established under the old law that when a husband
used marital community property to make improvements on his
own separate property, the improvements became his separate
property too, with the important proviso that the community was
entitled to reimbursement.7 6 It should follow from the changes
made in the new law that the wife will have the same power with
the same limitation. There are, however, exceptions to the require-
ment to reimburse the community and in such cases the opportu-
nity of either spouse to increase his or her separate property will
have its greatest significance.
Reimbursement to the community for community property im-
provements to a spouse's separate property is not required where
the other spouse has expressly or impliedly consented,77 ratified,78
or has been estopped to deny79 the use of the community property
to improve the other's separate estate. When one of these excep-
tions applies, a gift in effect has been bestowed upon the spouse
receiving the improvement to his or her separate property. Con-
sequently, either spouse will be able to increase separate property
holdings at the expense of the community under such conditions.
A significant development occasioned by the new changes will
be the increased amount of community property under the man-
agement and control of the spouses and as a result both in turn
76. In re Marriage of Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 256, 105 Cal. Rptr.
483, 491 (1972), citing Dunn v. Mullen, 211 Cal. 583, 589-90, 296 P. 604,
607 (1931); Estate of Bermatas, 162 Cal. App. 2d 693, 698, 328 P.2d 539,
542 (1958). See generally, de Funiak, Improving Separate Property or Re-
tiring Liens or Paying Taxes on Separate Property with Community Funds,
9 Ht sT. L. J. 36 (1957). [hereinafter cited as de Funiak].
77. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cleverdon, 16 Cal. 2d 788, 791-92, 108
P.2d 405, 406-07 (1940); Estate of La Belle, 93 Cal. App. 2d 538, 545, 209
P.2d 432, 436 (1949); Estate of Wooten, 64 Cal. App. 2d 96, 101, 148 P.2d
33, 35 (1944). But see Provost v. Provost, 102 Cal. App. 775, 781, 283 P.2d
842, 844 (1929).
78. Spreckles v. Spreckles, 172 Cal. 775, 786-89, 158 P. 537, 541-42 (1916).
79. See Vierra v. Pereira, 12 Cal. 2d 629, 632, 86 P.2d 816, 818 (1939);
Lahaney v. Lahaney, 208 Cal. 323, 281 P. 67 (1929).
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will have greater power to bestow gifts upon the other. Under
the old law gifts of community property given by the spouse with
management and control of such property became the separate
property of the donee spouse8 0 It is interesting to speculate about
the significance of this change; for example, if one spouse is the
sole wage earner and the other spouse generously bestows gifts
upon the wage-earning spouse, it will be possible to convert the
bulk of the wages into the wage-earner's separate property. Such
a result was generally not possible under the old law, absent inter-
vening circumstances (e.g., commingling of the wife's earnings with
the marital community property) because the non-working spouse
never acquired management and control over such wages and thus
could not make gifts of them to the wage-earning spouse.
The possibility of converting community property into the sep-
arate property of the spouses by making interspousal gifts has
several direct legal consequences. As between the spouses such
gifts would be final, but could be set aside if made to defraud
creditors.81 A correlative aspect of the finality of the gift is the
fact that the separate property characterization of the converted
property will survive dissolution of the marriage, whether by court
decree or by death of one of the spoiises. Furthermore, at the
time of the gift the donor spouse would lose his right to testamen-
tary disposition of his one-half interest in the community property
bestowed;8 2 whereas, the donee spouse will have absolute power
to dispose of such property in his will.83
V. DOES EQUAL CONTROL MEAN "EQUAL OWNERSHIP" UNDER
CALIFORNIA'S "PER1IZMSSIVE USE" STATUTES?
There is a longstanding public policy in California to protect the
public from harm sustained from motor vehicles by imposing a
statutory liability upon the "owner" of the vehicle which occa-
80. Estate of Inman, 148 Cal. App. 2d 952, 955, 307 P.2d 953, 957 (1957)[overruled on other grounds in Cooke v. Tsipouroglou, 59 Cal. 2d 660,
381 P.2d 940, 31 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1963)].
81. See Gould v. Fuller, 249 Cal. App. 2d 18, 24, 57 Cal. Rptr. 23, 27-
28 (1967). See also Marble v. Jackson, 184 Cal. 411, 417, 193 P. 940, 943
(1901).
82. CAL. PROBATE CODE § 201 (West 1965).
83. Id. § 20.
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sioned the harm. Vehicle Code Section 1715084 sets forth the ele-
ments giving rise to this statutory liability and those elements
have a direct bearing on the statute's application to married per-
sons in California because of the community property laws. Tradi-
tionally the spouse with management and control of a community
vehicle was treated as the owner of that vehicle for the purposes
of the permissive use statute. Since both spouses will have equal
control over the community vehicle under the new law, there may
be significant changes forthcoming in the application of the per-
missive use statute in relation to community property vehicle acci-
dents.
Is Interspousal Imputed Contributory Negligence
Back in California?
The doctrine of imputed contributory negligence has virtually
disappeared in most areas of the law,8 5 and the doctrine has expe-
rienced an unsettled history in California primarily caused by
the seemingly ever-changing community property laws of this
state.8 6 Yet in the realm of the permissive use statute in California
there are situations where the negligence of the operator of a
motor vehicle will be imputed to the owner of that vehicle by oper-
ation of the statute, so long as the owner has consented to the
use of the automobile by the negligent driver.
To the extent that one of the spouses was considered the owner
of the community vehicle, the provisions of the permissive use stat-
ute applied. In the majority of cases the community vehicle was
purchased with community funds under the control of the hus-
band; hence, he was treated as the owner under the permissive
use statute. To illustrate the operation of the permissive use stat-
84. CAL. VEi. CODE § 17150 (West 1971) [hereinafter referred to as the
"permissive use statute"].
85. W. PRossER, THE HANDBOOK OF i'E LAW OF TORTS 488 (4th ed. 1971).
86. The rationale underlying the doctrine of imputed contributory negli-
gence was to prevent the negligent spouse from being unjustly enriched
by acquiring a community property interest in the damages received by
the other spouse. Before 1957 the damages received by an injured spouse
were community property, hence the courts invoked the doctrine of im-
puted contributory negligence to bar recovery to the injured spouse. See
Hooper v. Romero, 262 Cal. App. 2d 574, 578-79, 68 Cal. Rptr. 749, 752-
53 (1968) (dicta). Legislative attempts to put the doctrine of imputed
contributory negligence finally to rest proved unsuccessful. See Knutson,
supra note 12, at 244-47; Brunn, California Personal Injury Damage
Awards to Married Persons, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 587, 598-603 (1966). The
latest legislative attempt to abolish imputed contributory negligence be-
tween spouses is evidenced in Civil Code Section 5112, which was not
amended by the new changes effective January 1, 1975. See CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 5112 (West 1970).
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ute in a community property law context the following analysis
will assume the hypothetical factual situation of a community
property vehicle accident in which the driver-spouse negligently
contributed to the injury of the passenger-spouse and a negligent
third party to the accident.
On these facts and under the old law, if the passenger-spouse
was the wife, the negligence of her husband as driver-spouse could
not be imputed to her to bar her claim for personal injury damages
against the negligent third party.8 7 Such a result followed when
the husband had management and control of the community ve-
hicle because his power to control the vehicle made him "owner"
of the vehicle for purposes of the permissive use statute.88 The
reasoning for this result was that the husband's sole control of
the vehicle rendered the "consent of the wife, express or implied,
to her husband's use or operation of the community automobile
S.. futile... [and] superfluous. '89
In contrast, if the husband was the passenger-spouse the contrib-
utory negligence of the wife as driver-spouse could be imputed to
the husband and prevent his recovery from the negligent third
party. Again the rationale for this result was based on the hus-
band's control over the community vehicle which gave him power
to consent to its use as the "owner" under the permissive use stat-
ute.90 It is apparent at this point that there are two essential ele-
ments which must be present before a person other than the driver
of a vehicle can be held liable under the permissive use statute
for damages resulting from the negligent operation of the vehicle:
(1) "It must have been owned at the time of the accident by such
person, and (2) it must have been operated with the permission,
express or implied, of such owner."91 For purposes of this discus-
87. Hooper v. Romero, 262 Cal. App. 2d 574, 578, 68 Cal. Rptr. 749, 752
(1968). See McCloud v. Roy Riegels Chemicals, 20 Cal. App. 3d 928, 932-
33, 97 Cal. Rptr. 910, 912-13 (1971).
88. Rody v. Winn, 162 Cal. App. 2d 35, 39, 327 P.2d 579, 582, (1958)
[overruled on other grounds in Cooke v. Tsipouroglou, 59 Cal. 2d 660,
381 P.2d 940, 31 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1963)]; 1 California Family Lawyer § 7.42
(1961).
89. Cox v. Kaufman, 77 Cal. App. 2d 449, 452, 175 P.2d 260, 261 (1946).
90. Id.
91. Vallejo v. Montebello Sewer Co. Inc., 209 Cal. App. 2d 721, 732, 26
Cal. Rptr. 447, 454 (1962).
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sion it is sufficient to note that both of these elements flow di-
rectly from control, by either spouse, of the community vehicle.
If the element of control over the community vehicle is given its
same importance under the new law (that is, that consent by the
spouse with control of the vehicle will result in imputed negli-
gence), then under the rationale of the prior cases9 2 both spouses
may be foreclosed from bringing an action for damages against
a negligent third party. Since under the new law both spouses
will have equal control over the community vehicle, it seems likely
that they will both be treated as "co-owners"19 3 under the permis-
sive use statute.
Support for this projected result under the new changes is prem-
ised on the fact that when spouses held ownership of a vehicle
under the old law as joint tenants or tenants in common they were
both subject to the operation of the permissive use statute.94 Fur-
thermore, it is arguable that the effect of the new changes will
be to make both spouses "owners" under the use statute as a mat-
ter of law.95 If this supposition is correct, an affirmative show-
ing of consent, express or implied, by either spouse will bring them
within the purview of the statute. The close relationship between
the spouses may additionally make it easier for a third party to
prove the implied permissive use of the community property ve-
hicle by the other.0 6 In short, if the spouses are treated as co-
owners with equal control over the community property vehicle,
both spouses would appear to be foreclosed from pursuing a claim
for damages against a negligent third party because of the imputa-
tion of negligence to both spouses due to the operation of the per-
missive use statute.
On the other hand, an alternative argument might be made that
since both spouses will have equal control of the community
92. See notes 87-91 supra.
93. Technically the spouses were co-owners of the community vehicle
under the old law because of the ". . . present, existing and equal inter-
ests" of the spouses in the community property. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 5105
(West 1970). See also CAL. Crv. CoDE § 682 (West 1954). However, for
purposes of the permissive use statute the element of control over the vehi-
cle's use was the factor which invoked the operation of the statute.
94. See Hooper v. Romero, 262 Cal. App. 2d 574, 579, 68 Cal. Rptr. 749,
752 (1968); Rody v. Winn, 162 Cal. App. 2d 35, 40, 327 P.2d 579, 582 (1958)
[overruZed on other grounds in Cooke v. Tsipouroglou, 59 Cal. 2d 660, 381
P.2d 940, 31 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1963)].
95. See Cox v. Kaufman, 77 Cal. App. 2d 449, 452, 175 P.2d 260, 261
(1946).
96. Northwestern Security Ins. Co. v. Monarch Ins. Co., 256 Cal. App.
2d 63, 63 Cal. Rptr. 802 (1967); Elkinton v. Cal. State Auto Assn., 173
Cal. App. 2d 338, 344, 343 P.2d 396, 399 (1959).
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vehicle under the new law, it should follow that neither has the
power to consent to or deny its use by the other. Under this ap-
proach only the operator-spouse would be subject to liability for
his direct negligence and the permissive use statute would not ap-
ply. Whenever both spouses are riding in the same vehicle as
either operator/passenger respectively, they would be exempt from
the operation of the statute, as each would lack the power to con-
sent which is requisite to invoking the statute.9 7
Innocent third parties would still be protected under this alter-
native because the direct negligence of either spouse would expose
the negligent spouse's separate property and al of the community
property to liability.98 An advantage of making this exception to
the permissive use statute would be that the innocent passenger-
spouse would not be precluded from pursuing a claim for damages
against a negligent third party, as would be the case if the spouses
are treated as owners under the permissive use statute.00 Overall,
this approach would further the policy of abolishing imputed con-
tributory negligence between spouses,100 and at the same time af-
ford adequate protection of the public from harm sustained in acci-
dents involving the community vehicle, because in all other cases
where either spouse has consented to the community property ve-
hicle's use by anyone except the other spouse the permissive use
statute would be fully operative.
New Community and Separate Property Liability
Incident to the Permissive Use Statute
Up to this point the discussion has concentrated on the imputed
contributory negligence aspects of the permissive use statute; how-
ever, an equally significant development occasioned by the new
law will be the new liability created by the statute if the spouses
97. See note 94 supra.
98. See text, supra at page 12.
99. See text and accompanying notes, supra at pages 24-26. An obstacle
to be overcome under this approach, however, would be the longstanding
policy against allowing the negligent spouse to be indirectly benefitted
by the damages received by the injured spouse. Since Section 5124 has
been repealed (effective January 1, 1975) and personal injury damages
received by the wife will no longer be under her exclusive control, it is
arguable that the negligent husband's potential for being unjustly enriched
is enhanced.
100. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 5112 (West 1970).
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are considered co-owners due to their equal control over the com-
munity vehicle. Again it will be useful to compare the old law
with the new changes (as each relates to the operation of the per-
missive use statute) by utilizing the same hypothetical facts as be-
fore. 01
If an innocent third party was injured in a community property
vehicle accident under the old law, the owner-spouse (who gen-
erally was the husband) 0 2 was subjected to liability to the extent
provided by the statute.103 Such liability could be satisfied from
the community property under that spouse's management and con-
trol or from his separate property, or both.104 In the context of
our hypothetical as it relates to the operation of the permissive
use statute it followed that the husband could subject the com-
munity property under his control and his separate property to
liability in two ways. First, as driver-spouse irrespective of the
permissive use statute; and secondly, as passenger-spouse under the
use statute because as "owner" he had consented to the use of the
vehicle by the wife.
On the other hand, if the wife was the passenger-spouse with
the husband operating the vehicle, then the permissive use stat-
ute would not apply to her because she was not considered the
"owner" for purposes of the statute. Consequently if the wife was
the passenger-spouse under the old law her separate property could
not be reached to satisfy third party claims because she had no
power to consent to the husband's operation of the vehicle. 0 5 To
the extent a wife is treated under the new law as a "co-owner"
under the permissive use statute she too will be able to subject
the entire community property and her separate property to liabil-
ity up to the statutory limit provided by law. It should be noted
here that if the wife is treated as a co-owner under the statute,
then for the first time in the history of California's community
101. See text, supra at pages 1018-19.
102. Note that under the old law the wife had no such liability except
in those unusual situations where the vehicle was her separate property
or community property under her management and control. See CAL. CiV.
CODE §§ 5107, 5124 (West 1970).
103. CAL. VEH. CODE § 17151 (West 1971). Section 17151 provides in per-
tinent part for maximum monetary limits of $15,000 per person, $30,000
total for each accident for personal injuries and $5,000 per accident for
property damage.
104. de Funiak, supra note 76, at 71; cf., Grolemund v. Cafferata, 17 Cal.
2d 679, 111 P.2d 641 (1941).
105. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 5121 (West 1970); Shepardson v. McLellan,
59 Cal. 2d 83, 87, 378 P.2d 108, 111, 27 Cal. Rptr. 884, 887 (1963). See
also Hooper v. Romero, 262 Cal. App. 2d 574, 578, 68 Cal. Rptr. 749, 753
(1968).
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property laws a wife will be subject to liability as a passenger
in a community property vehicle driven by her husband. 0 6
Furthermore, if the wife is treated as a co-owner within the pur-
view of Vehicle Code Section 17150 there will be unlimited access
to all the community property to satisfy the statutory liability be-
cause the wife will have equal control of the entire community
property under the new law. It should follow that the entire com-
munity assets will be subject to liability for third party claims
arising out of a community property vehicle accident, whether the
cause arises from the wife's direct negligence or from the statutory
liability imposed by the use statute.
Consistent with the foregoing analysis of the liability of the com-
munity and separate property of the spouses, Section 512207 has
been amended to establish priority as to the type of property avail-
able to satisfy a claim depending on the nature of the activity at
the time of the tortious act or omission. If the new changes are
construed to incorporate the general law principles applied to the
old sections, then each spouse can create, and would be subject
to, community property liability and separate property liability,
respectively. The amended version of Section 5122 merely sets
forth the priority of liability from these two sources as illustrated
by the following examples.
If the liability of a spouse is based upon an act or omission which
occurred while the spouse was performing an activity for the bene-
fit of the community, the liability will be satisfied first from the
community property and second from that spouse's separate prop-
erty.108 Conversely, if the activity was not for the benefit of
the community, the liability shall first be satisfied from the sep-
arate property of that spouse and second from the community
property. 0 9 A key issue to be resolved in applying the provisions
of new Section 5122 will be the factual determination of what con-
stitutes an "activity for the benefit of the community". Practically
speaking nearly every act of either spouse could be construed, at
least tangentially, as benefiting the community directly or indi-
rectly.
106. See note 102 supra.
107. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5122 (West Supp. 1974).
108. Id. § 5122(b) (1).
109. Id. § 5122(b) (2).
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If the "activity benefitting the community" is construed liberally
by the courts, it will follow that the bulk of spousal liability will
be satisfied first from the community property. Should this con-
struction of the statute be adopted then the relative solvency of
the spouses versus the wealth of the community will become im-
portant. For example, when a negligent spouse has very limited
separate property assets and the community has substantial re-
sources, it would behoove the negligent spouse to contend that the
activity was for the benefit of the community so the liability would
be satisfied first from the community assets.
In contrast, if the negligent spouse has substantial separate assets
and the community property is limited, then the non-negligent
spouse will want the activity characterized as not benefitting the
community so the liability will be satisfied first from the negli-
gent spouse's separate property, thus preserving the community
property interest of the non-negligent spouse. In short, an impor-
tant triable issue of fact is created by the amended version of Sec-
tion 5122 with potentially divergent interests of the spouses at
stake. It should be noted that third party claimants will not be
adversely affected by this section because ultimately a judgment
can be satisfied from either the community property or the negli-
gent spouse's separate property.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the first time in the history of this state, married women
in California will be on equal terms with their husbands under
the community property laws. There is no doubt that married
women in general will enjoy new rights under the equal manage-
ment and control system that heretofore were denied them. On
the other hand, along with these new rights will come new obliga-
tions and liabilities previously borne only by the husband under
the old law.
Whether the new rights afforded married women will outweigh
these new responsibilities will depend in large part upon the in-
dividual attributes of any given wife and also upon the financial
and social makeup of each marital relationship. Wives with sub-
stantial separate property assets will find the new changes pose
a potential threat to these holdings; however, wives with limited
separate property resources will welcome the increased access they
will have to the entire community property.
In contrast to the potential ramifications affecting married
women, the husband will remain in essentially the same relative
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position in regard to his rights and liabilities in community affairs.
If anything, his obligations as head of the household have been
diminished by the new changes. Finally, while some marriages
may experience difficulties adapting to the new changes, creditors
will warmly receive the new changes which will enhance the po-
tential for credit transactions with married women and at the same
time afford additional security for such transactions.
JoHN A. ADAmsKE
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